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Abstract
We provide a comprehensive analysis of how firms choose between different expan-
sion and contraction forms, unifying existing approaches from the industrial organization
and corporate finance literature. Using novel data covering almost the entire universe
of UK firms, we document firms’ use of internal adjustment, greenfield investment and
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We describe frequency and aggregate importance of
the different channels, and show that their use varies systematically with observable firm
characteristics, in particular firm size and the magnitude of adjustment. We also demon-
strate that there is positive assortative matching on the UK merger market. Based on
these facts, we propose a theoretical framework which accommodates all three adjustment
channels in a unified setting, and is able to replicate the adjustment and matching pat-
terns found in the data.
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1 Introduction
Firms constantly adapt to changes in their market environment and technological possibilities.
One key mechanism through which this adjustment takes place is through changes in the scale
and scope of their operations. Indeed, the importance and magnitude of micro-level adjustments
in employment and turnover has been extensively documented in the literature (see Davis et al.,
2006, for a recent overview). Building on these empirical facts, a number of theoretical models
have been developed over the past decades which have significantly improved our understanding
of individual firms’ growth processes and their implications for aggregates such as industry-level
employment, productivity or firm size distributions (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992;
Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Asplund and Nocke, 2006).
At the same time, however, only little attention has been paid to the actual channels through
which firm expansions and contractions take place. Changes in firm-level employment and
turnover can be achieved in three principal ways. On the one hand, firms can adjust internally,
i.e., by changing employment or output at existing production facilities while continuing to use
them. On the other hand, firms can expand or contract externally by changing the number
of establishments or divisions they operate. This external adjustment, in turn, can happen
via greenfield investment, i.e., by shutting down or opening up establishments or divisions; or
through the market for corporate control, i.e., by buying or selling parts of a firm’s operations
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
The choice of adjustment channel can have very different economic implications. Firm and
plant closures usually lead to substantial social costs in terms of temporary unemployment
of workers or lost technological and product-specific know-how (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2008). On the other hand, researchers like Jensen (1993) have argued that M&As present
a more efficient form of resource transfer between expanding and contracting firms and that
over-restrictive regulations prevent firms from using this mechanism.
Despite these considerations, there exists to our knowledge no analysis of the different adjust-
ment channels in one integrated setting. Research in corporate finance has analysed determi-
nants of M&As and asset sales without comparing them to other adjustment mechanisms such
as plant contraction or closure (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Schoar, 2002). Likewise,
studies in industrial economics have been predominantly at the establishment level (e.g., Disney
et al., 2003; Foster et al., 2006) and have thus abstracted from adjustment processes such as
greenfield and M&A that are important at the firm level. This lack of an integrated analysis
of corporate adjustment strategies is an important omission, not only because of the differ-
ent economic implications described above, but also because the choice of adjustment channel
depends on the alternatives available to the individual firm.
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In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by analysing all three adjustment channels in a unified
framework. We start by presenting a number of novel stylised facts about firms’ choice of
adjustment forms, using unique business register data for the United Kingdom. In contrast to
most of the existing literature, our data allow for an analysis of all three adjustment channels
in one integrated setting. They are also not limited to publicly traded firms or to the manu-
facturing sector, and as such are much more comprehensive than existing sources, representing
over 99% of UK turnover and employment between 1997 and 2005.
We show that even though only a small fraction of adjustments take place through the creation
or closure of new establishments or the use of M&As, these events trigger changes in turnover
which are up to 40 times larger than the average internal adjustment (i.e., changes at existing
establishments). As a consequence, external adjustment forms account on average for almost
25% of firm-level changes in turnover, and substantially more in some industrial sectors. We
also show that simple firm-level variables such as firm size or the size of a given expansion
or contraction strongly correlate with the choice of adjustment channel. In particular, larger
firms and those carrying out large expansions or contractions rely more on the two external
adjustment forms. Finally, we examine matching patterns in the UK merger market and find
that matching is positive assortative (i.e., large firms buy other large firms) rather than nega-
tive assortative as predicted by existing theories of adjustment via M&A (e.g., Jovanovic and
Rousseau, 2002).
Based on these facts, we propose a theoretical framework in which firms respond to shocks to
their marginal costs by expanding or contracting their production capacity through one of the
three adjustment forms. Specifically, an individual firm’s decision between internal and external
adjustment is driven by a span of control problem which gives rise to a trade-off between firm
scope and productivity at existing establishments, similar to Nocke and Yeaple (2008). The
preferred mode of external adjustment, in turn, is determined on the market for corporate
control, where potential acquirers are matched with potential targets, both of which face the
outside option of remaining unmatched and relying on greenfield adjustment instead. We show
under which assumptions the model generates the correlations found in the data between a
firm’s choice of adjustment channel and firm and adjustment size, while also replicating the
positive assortative pattern of matching we observe on the UK merger market.
Apart from the corporate finance and industrial economics literature discussed above, our
paper relates to two important recent contributions by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and
Warusawitharana (2008). These authors propose models of firm dynamics which incorporate
both internal adjustment and M&As, and present empirical evidence to support them. While
thus similar in motivation, there are a number of important differences between these papers
and our work. First, neither Jovanovic and Rousseau nor Warusawitharana provide a separate
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analysis of greenfield investment, implicitly treating it as part of internal adjustments. As we
shall see below, this is not merely a minor modification but substantially changes the firm’s
decision problem. In order to address this issue appropriately, we also rely on a conceptually
different modelling framework, which is our second contribution. Rather than invoking the
theory of investment under adjustment costs (which is appropriate for the question posed by
the above authors), we use insights from the multi-product firm and matching literatures. This
is necessary to accommodate all three forms of adjustment in one integrated setting and also
brings the model closer to the data by separately modelling firms and individual plants.
Third, our model also differs in one important empirical prediction from Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002) and Warusawitharana (2008). Specifically, it predicts positive assortitative matching on
the M&A market, which is consistent with our own evidence for the UK, as well as with recent
studies for the United States (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Robinson and Viswanathan, 2008).
Finally, we are able to use much more comprehensive data than previous studies, covering
99% of employment and turnover in the United Kingdom, rather than focusing exclusively on
publicly traded firms. We think that this broader focus is essential, given that our results show
that the relative importance of the three adjustment channels varies dramatically with firm
size.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data and presents a
number of stylised facts on the choice of adjustment channels by UK firms. Section 3 describes
our theoretical framework and discusses the assumptions necessary to replicate the patterns
found in the data. Section 4 concludes. Two appendices contain further details on our empirical
data and the proofs of our theoretical model’s propositions.
2 Stylised Facts on Firm-Level Adjustment Channels
2.1 Description of data
Our primary data source is the Business Structure Database (BSD) which is maintained by
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the United Kingdom. The BSD is constructed
from annual snapshots of the UK’s business register, the IDBR. For each year between 1997
and 2005, it contains the universe of British companies which were either registered for Value
Added Tax (VAT) purposes or operated a Pay as You Earn (PAYE) income tax scheme. In
2005 the BSD was comprised of 2.2 million live enterprises, representing an estimated 99% of
economic activity in terms of employment and turnover (ONS, 2006). The comprehensiveness
of the BSD is in contrast to the data sources used in related studies of M&A activity which
focus mainly on publicly traded, and thus large, firms (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002;
4
Warusawitharana, 2008).
The BSD captures the structure of ownership of firms, plants and business sites that make
up the British economy using different aggregation categories. In this paper, we focus on the
categories ‘enterprise groups’ and ‘enterprises’ which for the purpose of our analysis can be
thought of as firms and plants, respectively, in the sense of our theoretical model below (see
Appendix A for the exact statistical definitions of enterprise groups and enterprises and a
discussion of the appropriate choice of aggregation level).
Upon entry into the IDBR, each enterprise and enterprise group is allocated a unique reference
number which remains with the unit for as long as it stays on the register. Furthermore, the
ONS maintains a list of enterprises for each enterprise group, using information from Dun and
Bradstreet and the VAT system (ONS, 2006). Thus, every enterprise also has an enterprise
group reference number.
These identifiers allow the analysis of demographic events over time. We have developed an
algorithm to identify these events, following a general typology provided by Eurostat (European
Commission, 2003). In our methodology, the most basic event is a change in employment or
turnover at a continuing enterprise (‘internal adjustment’). This is easily observed from the
entries of two adjacent years for the same enterprise. If an enterprise identifier disappears from
the data, we code this as a plant exit. Likewise, the appearance of a new identifier is coded
as a plant entry (‘greenfield investment’). Finally, the combination of enterprise and enterprise
group references allows for the analysis of ownership changes. For example, if enterprise group
A buys enterprise 1 from enterprise group B, the enterprise reference number of enterprise 1
will remain unchanged but its enterprise group identifier will change from B to A. Of course,
an enterprise group can carry out several or all of these activities in a given year. For example,
it might expand employment and turnover at one of its existing enterprises, create a new
enterprise via greenfield investment and buy another one from another enterprise group (‘M&A
investment’).
2.2 Stylised facts
2.2.1 Frequency, aggregate importance and firm-level determinants of adjustment
strategies
We begin by providing some basic information about the frequency, size and aggregate im-
portance of the three adjustment channels. Panel A of Table 1 displays the fraction of all
adjustments of turnover (i.e., sales revenue) in the UK economy between 1997 and 2005 which
5
take place through each of the three channels.1 Note that firms can use several channels at the
same time so that the percentages do not have to add up to 100%. It is evident from Table
1 that M&As and greenfield investment are rare events. On average, these two channels were
used in only about 1% of turnover expansions and contractions in the UK economy, with the
vast majority of both expansion and contractions occurring via internal adjustments.
Fact 1. M&As and greenfield investment are rare events. Over 99% of turnover expansions
and contractions involve internal adjustments, whereas only about 1% rely at least in
part on M&A or greenfield investments/disinvestments.
Panel B shows that, when they take place, M&As and greenfield investments are major events.
The average M&A expansion is almost 40 times larger than the average internal expansion in
terms of the added turnover, and the average M&A contraction is 30 times larger than internal
contractions. Greenfield investments are smaller than M&A expansions but still around 12
times larger than the average internal expansion. Greenfield disinvestments, in contrast, are of
comparable size to M&As at over 30 times the size of internal contractions.
Panel B implies that despite their infrequent occurrence, greenfield investment and M&A still
account for a large fraction of overall turnover adjustments. Panel C displays the exact numbers.
As seen, the two forms together account for 18% of economy-wide turnover expansions and
for 26% of contractions. M&As account for a larger share of overall adjustments – around
15% on both the expansion and the contraction side of adjustment. Greenfield transactions, in
contrast, are significantly more important in explaining contractions: 11% of aggregate turnover
reductions are achieved via firm/establishment closures while the corresponding number on the
expansion side is just 2%.
Fact 2. M&As and greenfield expansions and contractions are an order of magnitude larger
than internal adjustments. Consequently, and despite their infrequent occurrence, they
account for up to a quarter of economy-wide turnover adjustments.
How do firms choose between the three adjustment forms? Tables 2 and 3 provide some initial
evidence on how firm size (measured by initial turnover, i.e., before the adjustment in question)
and the size of a given turnover expansion or contraction correlate with the choice of adjustment
1The BSD contains information on both turnover and employment at the enterprise level. We focus on
turnover since this information is updated on a yearly basis, whereas this is not necessarily the case for employ-
ment, in particular for some of the smaller enterprises (see Appendix A for details). In practice, however, all of
the results presented in the following are qualitatively identical when using employment (results available from
the authors upon request).
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channel. We use these two basic firm-level determinants because they have been the focus of
the existing literature (see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Warusawitharana, 2008).
Panels A and B of Table 2 show that internal adjustment accounts for close to 100% of the
overall expansions and contractions of the bottom 50% of firms in terms of turnover (i.e.,
those firms with initial turnover equal to or less than £152,000 in 1995 prices). However, the
importance of the two external adjustment channels increases steadily with firm size. For the
largest 0.1% of enterprise groups (corresponding to a turnover of more than approximately
£150 million), M&As and greenfield investment account for 16% and 13% of overall turnover
expansions, respectively (17% and 14% for turnover contractions).
A similar pattern arises when we look at the size of a given turnover adjustment (Table 3). The
smallest 50% of expansions and contractions (those changing turnover by less than approxi-
mately £27,000) are almost exclusively carried out via internal adjustment. As adjustment size
increases, however, M&As and greenfield investment become more important. For the largest
0.1% of expansions (those expanding turnover by at least £61.5 million), around 18% of the
overall size increase is achieved via M&As, and 4% via greenfield investment. For the largest
0.1% of contractions (those reducing turnover by more than £74 million), M&A accounts for
21% and greenfield disinvestment for 14%.
One shortcoming of the purely descriptive approach in Tables 2 and 3 is that one cannot analyse
multivariate correlations in such a setting. In particular, it is the case in our data that large
firms carry out large expansions and contractions. Thus, it is unclear whether the correlations
displayed in Tables 2 and 3 are driven by firm size, adjustment size, or a combination of both.
In addition, these univariate correlations might simply pick up sectoral differences in M&A
and greenfield activity caused by other sector-wide determinants, such as differences in market
concentration, which are likely to be correlated with average firm and adjustment size.
To address these issues, we employ multivariate fractional regression methods (see Papke and
Wooldridge, 1996; Mullahy and Robert, 2008). Denoting the fraction of a gross turnover
expansion or contraction carried out by firm i through adjustment form m by yim, we assume
that
E(yim|xi) = exp (xiαm)∑M
j=1 exp (xiαj)
=
exp (xiαm)
1 +
∑M−1
j=1 exp (xiαj)
, (1)
where matrix xi contains the independent variables (firm size, expansion size) and αj the cor-
responding regression coefficients (note the normalization αM = 0). The advantage of the
multinomial logit functional form embodied in (1) is that it imposes two conditions which cap-
ture key features of our data. First, E(yim|xi) [0, 1] for all i andm; and secondly,
∑M
m=1E(yim|xi) =
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1 for all i.2
Table 4 presents the results. In all specifications, we control for year and two-digit industry
fixed effects (55 industries) to reduce problems arising from omitted sector characteristics, as
discussed above. We have chosen internal adjustment as the excluded category so that coeffi-
cient estimates should be interpreted as changes relative to internal expansions or contractions.
Looking at expansions first, internal adjustment clearly declines as a fraction of overall adjust-
ment as firm size and the size of the planned expansion increase. Secondly, initial firm size and
expansion size have a different impact on M&As and greenfield. While both forms of external
adjustment increase in importance with firm and expansion size, the latter variable has a much
stronger impact on M&As and the former on greenfield investment. It thus seems that firms
undertaking larger expansions will increasingly rely on M&A. A similar pattern seems to hold
on the contraction side, although the differences between M&As and greenfield investment are
much less pronounced here.3
In Table 5, we carry out an additional robustness check by using Tobit and Poisson rather than
multivariate fractional logit. These two alternative estimation techniques are both suitable
for accomodating the large number of zeros for M&A and greenfield adjustment (compare
Table 1) but do not impose any adding-up constraints on predicted values. In this table, we
separately regress the fraction of an adjustment carried out through each of the three channels
on firm size and the size of an expansion/contraction. Reassuringly, the results are similar to
Table 4. Internal adjustment declines in importance with increasing firm and adjustment size,
whereas both of the external adjustment forms increase in importance. Comparing the relative
coefficient magnitudes between greenfield and M&A adjustment, we again find that firm size
has a larger effect on greenfield than on M&A, whereas the opposite holds true for the size of
an expansion/contraction (again, results are clearer on the expansion than on the contraction
side).
Fact 3. Large expansions and contractions are predominantly undertaken via external adjust-
2Estimation of the parameters in (1) is carried out via pseudo-maximum-likelihood methods. A desirable
feature of the multivariate fractional logit model is that the parameters αj will be consistently estimated even
when yim takes on values at the extremes of the bounded range they occupy (i.e., y = 0 or y = 1, as is frequently
the case in our data). All that is required is that the conditional mean E(yim|xi) is correctly specified (see
Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, for the univariate case; Mullahy and Robert, 2008, provide an extension to the
multivariate case analysed here).
3In an additional robust check (see Table A4), we restrict the sample to external expansions/contractions
only, in order to compare the relative importance of greenfield investment and M&As more directly. Consistent
with the results reported here, firm size had a negative and significant impact on the fraction of expansion
carried out through M&As, and expansion size had a significantly positive impact. The same pattern appeared
for contractions but the differences between the two external adjustment forms were economically negligible
and only statistically significant for firm size.
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ment.
Fact 4. Large firms rely more on external adjustment than small firms.
Fact 5. When choosing between the two forms of external expansion, large firms rely more on
greenfield than M&As. Firm size does not influence the choice of adjustment channel for
external contractions.
Fact 6. When choosing between the two forms of external adjustment, firms rely more on
M&As than on greenfield when the desired expansion size is large. The size of the desired
adjustment does not influence the choice of adjustment channel for external contractions.
The finding that firms rely more on M&As for large expansions is consistent with previous
empirical results in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Warusawitharana (2008), and lends
support to the theoretical mechanisms proposed in these papers. Note, however, that at least
on the expansion side, there also seem to be clear-cut empirical regularities on how firms choose
between the two external adjustment forms. To the best of our knowledge, no theoretical
mechanism has been proposed to date to explain these patterns.
Finally, we note that so far we have focused on economy-wide patterns only, and have paid no
attention to potential sectoral differences. In unreported results, we show that there is indeed
substantial sectoral variation in the relative importance of the three adjustment channels. For
example, we find that the two external adjustment forms account for between 25% and 35%
of aggregate turnover expansions in sectors such as manufacturing, utilities and mining, but
for less than 3% in agriculture. On the contraction side, these variations are even larger,
ranging from around 4% in agriculture to 35% in manufacturing, and to over 50% in mining
and utilities. At the same time, however, the correlation patterns between firm and adjustment
size and the choice of adjustment channel are surprisingly stable across individual sectors. In
all the major sectors which we analysed, reliance on external adjustment forms increases with
firm size and with the size of an expansion or contraction (results are available from the authors
upon request for 18 separate sectors which together account for 99% of UK turnover). This is
why we will try to develop a general, rather than a sector-specific, theory of firm adjustment
channels in Section 3 below, which should be applicable to a large number of sectors with
suitable parameter adjustments.
2.2.2 Matching patterns on the UK merger market
We are also interested in the pattern of matches formed on the market for corporate control.
The prediction of models such as the ‘Q-theory of mergers’ (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002)
is that there should be negative assortative matching between acquirers and targets, because
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gains from trade in these settings increase in the cost differential between the merging firms.
However, recent empirical research for the U.S. suggests that merger patterns might instead
be positive assortative (see Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008; and
Han and Rousseau, 2009). Since the nature of the matching process has important implications
for how we model adjustment channels, we briefly examine matching patterns in the UK, again
using a substantially larger sample than all previous research.
In Table 6, we consider acquirer-target matches and regress the acquirer’s size on the target’s
size. As seen in column 1, the correlation of target and acquirer size is indeed positive and
highly statistically significant. In column 2, we control for industry-pair fixed effects to rule
out the possibility that those correlations are driven by cross- or within-industry acquisition
patterns. For example, we might find a positive correlation simply because firm size varies
substantially across industries and a substantial proportion of acquisitions take place within
industries, even if within-industry size correlations are actually negative. The same would be
true if cross-industry acquisitions predominantly took place between industries with similar
average sizes. By including a fixed effect for each acquirer-target industry combination in our
data, column 2 controls for such industry-specific effects. As seen, including industry-pair fixed
effects slightly lowers the acquirer-target size correlation, but it remains positive and highly
statistically significant.
Finally, columns 3 and 4 include the size of the acquired enterprise as an additional control
variable (i.e., in addition to the size of the enterprise group selling this enterprise which we
denoted by ‘target size’ above). In our data, large acquirers tend to undertake large expansions,
so that a positive size correlation might simply pick up the fact that acquirers want to save
on transaction costs by buying one large target, rather than several smaller ones (and that it
is the large enterprise groups that have the largest enterprises and are thus the most natural
transaction partners). Including this additional control variable again reduces the firm size
correlation slightly, but the relevant coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. We
conclude that the evidence is strongly suggestive of a positive assortitative matching pattern
on the UK merger market.
Fact 7. Matching on the market for corporate control is positive assortative (‘like-buys-like’).
Apart from the correlation of target and acquirer size, a full description of matching patterns
also requires looking at average acquirer-target size differences. That is, we would not only
like to know whether the transaction parties’ sizes are positively correlated but also whether
the acquirer or the target is larger. In Table 8 we report some simple statistics on average
acquirer-target size differences (again in terms of initial enterprise group turnover). First, we
calculate the average size difference for each industry in log points of initial turnover, and then
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average across industries to obtain the differences shown in Table 8 (line 1). As seen, acquirers
are on average 1.42 log points larger than targets. Looking sector by sector, acquirers are larger
than targets in 92% of industries, with the difference being statistically significant in 85% of
cases. In only 8% of sectors are targets larger than acquirers on average, and this difference is
only statistically significant in 3% of all industries. We conclude that on average, acquirers are
larger than the firms from which they acquire assets.
Fact 8. Firms acquiring assets are larger than the firms from which they acquire these assets
(the targets).
3 The Model
We now propose a simple model which is consistent with the above facts. Our starting point is
that firms adjust the scale and scope of their production in response to idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks. In order to rationalize the induced pattern of adjustment, our model combines
two basic building blocks.
Firstly, it formalises a trade-off between scope and productivity of monopolistically competitive
multi-plant firms, similar to Nocke and Yeaple (2008): the more plants are under control of a
given firm, the higher the marginal cost of production at any given establishment. This span of
control problem breaks the equivalence between the intensive (changes in the scale of production
at a given plant) and the extensive (changes in the number of plants) margin of adjustment. In
terms of our data, these margins correspond directly to what we previously called internal and
external adjustment, respectively. Accordingly, our goal in this part of the paper (Section 3.2)
is to verify if, and under what assumptions, our model will be able to replicate stylised facts
1-4.
Secondly, our model endogenises the choice between the two channels of external adjustment in
terms of a matching problem (Section 3.3). Given our interest in replicating stylised facts, the
matching approach is a natural choice since the resulting equilibrium on the market for corpo-
rate control offers rich empirical predictions. This is because, when considering an acquisition
(divestiture), firms take into account (i) the characteristics of the potential target (acquirer),
and (ii) their outside option of relying on greenfield activity instead. Hence, we are able to
explain outcomes on the market for corporate control – who engages in M&A activity, and with
which partner – in terms of observable firm and transaction characteristics. The goal in this
second part of the model is thus to check the consistency of its predictions with stylised facts
4-8.
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3.1 Demand and technology
We consider an economy where monopolistically competitive firms differ in their organisa-
tional capabilities. Accordingly, firms are seen as a bundle of technological and organisational
resources, and cross-sectional variation in firm size and scope reflects the underlying hetero-
geneity of these non-mobile capabilities across firms (Matsusaka, 2001). As in our data, firms
can comprise multiple plants, and we assume that a given firm’s plants sell products which
are differentiated from one another. Key to the firm problem is a trade-off between scope and
productivity, similar to a growing number of studies concerned with firm heterogeneity (Nocke
and Yeaple, 2008; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2009, 2010).
Our model’s basic structure in this subsection follows Nocke and Yeaple (2008). There is a
mass L of identical consumers with the following linear-quadratic utility function,
U =
∫
x(j)dj −
∫
[x(j)]2 dj − 2σ
[∫
x(j)dj
]2
+ Z, (2)
where x(j) is consumption of product j in the differentiated goods industry, Z is consumption of
an outside good, and σ > 0 is a parameter that measures the degree of product differentiation.
Assuming consumer income is sufficiently large, an individual consumer’s inverse demand for
product j is then given by
p(j) = 1− 2x(j)− 4σ
∫
x(l)dl.
The outside good is produced in a perfectly competitive industry which operates under con-
stant returns to scale. In the differentiated goods industry, there is a mass M of atomless firms
which differ in their organisational capabilities. A firm’s organisational capability is given by
the pair (c0, θ), where both c0 and θ are positive parameters drawn from continuous distrib-
ution functions defined over a finite support. The parameter θ is time-invariant, while c0 is
subject to firm-specific shocks. Firms can comprise any number n ≥ 1 of plants, all of which
operate under the common organisational capabilities idiosyncratic to the firm.4 Hence, there
is (technological) heterogeneity across firms, but not across the individual plants belonging to
a given firm.
We presume that firms have constant marginal cost at the plant level but that they face
decreasing returns to the span of control at the firm level, e.g., as a consequence of scarce
managerial resources (Lucas, 1978). For concreteness, we adopt the following specification of
the marginal cost common to the plants of a firm with organisational capability (c0, θ):
c(n; c0, θ) = c0e
n/θ. (3)
4Notice that, in what follows, we ignore integer constraints for n.
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We choose this specification for analytical convenience and also, as will become clear later,
because it allows us to isolate θ as a determinant of firm size but not of plant size.5 The
specification in (3) gives marginal cost in multi-plant firms as a nonlinear function defined by
an intercept of c0e
1/θ for a single-plant firm (n = 1) and an elasticity with respect to the number
of plants of n/θ. The key properties of this marginal cost function, which will be important in
the following, are
∂c(n; c0, θ)
∂n
> 0,
∂2c(n; c0, θ)
∂θ∂n
< 0,
∂c(n; c0, θ)
∂c0
> 0. (4)
The first property formalises the span of control problem: an increase in a firm’s number of
plants increases its individual plants’ marginal cost.6 The second property, in turn, indicates
that the intensity of the span of control problem is decreasing in the scope parameter θ. Finally,
we assume that the firm’s marginal cost is increasing in the autonomous marginal cost term c0.
In addition to the marginal cost of production c(n; c0, θ), a firm faces a fixed cost of ρ per
plant. Each firm’s profit maximization problem then consists of the choice of (i) the number
of plants n, and (ii) the quantity xj of output produced at each of its plants j ∈ [1, n]. We
examine this problem in three steps. First, for a given number n of plants, we analyze the
intensive margin problem, i.e., the firm’s plant-level quantity choice. Then, we consider the
firm’s extensive margin problem, i.e., the determination of firm scope via the optimal choice of
the number n(c0, θ) of plants. Finally, in Section 3.3, we analyze the firm’s extensive margin
decision between greenfield expansion/contraction and M&A.
In terms of our empirical analysis, the decision of how to partition a given size adjustment
between changes in the number of plants and changes in each existing plant’s size corresponds
to the choice between internal and external adjustment as described by stylised facts 1-4. The
decision whether to rely on M&As or greenfield to achieve a given change in the optimal number
of plants, in turn, corresponds to the choice of external adjustment channel as described in facts
5-8.
3.2 Internal vs external adjustment
3.2.1 Plant-level quantity choice
The linear-quadratic specification of consumer preferences gives rise to a linear demand system.
Hence, in equilibrium, firms operating in the differentiated goods industry face a linear residual
5We discuss the generality of our results with respect to functional form assumptions below.
6Schoar (2002) provides empirical evidence indicating that the addition of new product lines has an adverse
effect on the productivity of a firm’s existing plants.
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demand curve for the output produced in each of their individual plants,
D(p) =
L
2
(a− p),
where p is the price and a the endogenous demand intercept, which is taken as given by the
monopolistically competitive firms. It follows that inverse demand is
P (x) = a− 2x
L
,
where x is output.
The endogenous demand intercept a is common to all firms and thus to their respective plants.
Since marginal costs, as determined by (c0, θ), are symmetric across a firm’s plants, the firm
will optimally produce the same quantity at each of its plants. Given a firm’s number n of
plants, its profit-maximizing level of output per plant is then given by
x(c(n; c0, θ)) ≡ argmax
x
[P (x)− c(n; c0, θ)]x = L
4
(a− c(n; c0, θ)). (5)
Accordingly, gross profits at the plant level are
pi(c(n; c0, θ)) ≡ [P (x(c(n; c0, θ)))− c(n; c0, θ)]x(c(n; c0, θ)) = L
8
(a− c(n; c0, θ))2. (6)
3.2.2 Determination of firm scope
Firm scope, defined as the number n of plants of a given firm, is optimally determined as
n(c0, θ) ≡ argmax
n
[pi(c(n; c0, θ))− ρ]n,
where ρ indicates the fixed cost of adding another plant. From the envelope theorem,
pi′(c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ)) = −x(c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ)), so that the first-order condition for n(c0, θ) can be
written as
[pi(c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ))− ρ]− n(c0, θ)x(c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ))∂c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ)
∂n
= 0. (7)
From (7), the impact of an additional plant on the firm’s profit can be decomposed into two
terms: (i) the profit net of the fixed cost of the marginal plant, and (ii) the negative effect via
the increased marginal cost of production c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ) at all plants. Following Nocke and
Yeaple (2008), we refer to this second term as the inframarginal cost effect.
The specification of marginal cost in (3) implies that n(·)∂c(n(·); ·)/∂n = c(n(·); ·) log( c(n(·);·)
c0
).
Hence, the choice of the number of plants enters (7) only through the induced marginal cost
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c˜(c0, θ) ≡ c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ). We adopt the assumption that the fixed cost ρ is not too large, so
that the firm earns a stricly positive profit if it only operates a single plant, i.e.,
pi(c0e
1/θ) =
[
P (x(c0e
1/θ))− c0e1/θ
]
x(c0e
1/θ) =
L
8
(
a− c0e1/θ
)2
> ρ. (8)
This allows us to proceed with a description of the relationship between a firm’s organisational
capability (c0, θ) and its marginal cost.
Lemma 1 The optimal determination of firm scope implies that a firm’s number of plants
n(c0, θ) is chosen such that induced marginal cost c˜(c0, θ) ≡ c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ) is increasing in c0
and constant in θ. Specifically,
n(c0, θ) = θ log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
and
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
< 0,
dn(c0, θ)
dθ
> 0,
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
> 0,
dc˜(c0, θ)
dθ
= 0.
The fundamental determinants of a firm’s induced marginal cost c˜(c0, θ) are the autonomous
cost term c0 and the scope parameter θ. As expected, a higher c0 gives rise to higher induced
marginal cost. Intuitively, a variation in c0 triggers a movement in the optimal number of plants
n(c0, θ) which mitigates the effect of c0 on c˜(c0, θ), but does not eliminate it. By contrast, a
variation in θ leads to an adjustment in the number of plants which just compensates the direct
effect on c˜(c0, θ). In detail, for a given number n of plants, the magnitude of the inframarginal
cost effect, χ(c(n; c0, θ); c0, θ) ≡ nx(c(n; c0, θ))∂c(n; c0, θ)/∂n, exerted by the marginal plant is
decreasing in θ. Thus, firms with a higher θ optimally choose a larger number of plants; however,
n(c0, θ) is increasing at a rate such that induced marginal cost c˜(c0, θ) actually remains constant.
3.2.3 Reformulation in terms of observables
We now link the model’s central parameters, i.e., those describing a firm’s organisational capa-
bility (c0, θ), to the observable variables used in the empirical section of this paper (firm size
as measured by turnover, and the size of a given turnover expansion/contraction). This will
later allow us to reinterpret the model’s comparative statics with respect to c0 and θ in terms
of these basic firm-level characteristics.
First, optimal turnover (i.e., sales), per plant in the model are given by
s(c˜(c0, θ)) ≡ P (x(c˜(c0, θ)))x(c˜(c0, θ)) = L
8
(
a2 − c˜(c0, θ)2
)
. (9)
This is a measure for plant size, and its variation in reaction to idiosyncratic shocks captures
the importance of internal adjustment. Note that c0 and θ only influence plant size through
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their effect on induced marginal cost, and that ds(c(n; c0, θ))/dc(n; c0, θ) < 0; that is, there is
a negative relationship between a plant’s marginal cost and its size. Together with Lemma 1
this implies that firms with a high c0 have smaller plants, whereas variation in θ does not have
any consequences for plant size.
Second, our model also predicts a relationship between a firm’s cost structure and its total size.
For comparability with the empirical section, we measure firm size by aggregate sales across a
firm’s plants,
S(c˜(c0, θ)) ≡ n(c0, θ)s(c˜(c0, θ)) = θ log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
L
8
(
a2 − c˜(c0, θ)2
)
. (10)
The following lemma is concerned with the relation between S(c˜(c0, θ)) and a firm’s organisa-
tional capabilities (c0, θ).
Lemma 2 A firm’s aggregate sales S(c˜(c0, θ)) are decreasing in c0 and increasing in θ:
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dc0
< 0,
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dθ
> 0.
Accordingly, firm size is decreasing in autonomous marginal cost c0, but increasing in the scope
parameter θ.
3.2.4 Reaction to idiosyncratic shocks and link to stylised facts 1-4
We are now in a position to analyse firms’ response to idiosyncratic technology shocks.
Lemma 3 Consider the effect of a shock to a firm’s autonomous marginal cost c0.
(i) A given shock to c0 has a stronger effect on the firm’s optimal number of plants n(c0, θ),
the larger its organisational capacity θ:
d
dθ
(
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
)
< 0.
(ii) A given shock to c0 has the same effect on the firm’s induced marginal cost c˜(c0, θ),
irrespective of its organisational capacity θ:
d
dθ
(
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
)
= 0.
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(iii) A given shock to c0 has a stronger effect on the firm’s aggregate sales S(c˜(c0, θ)), the
larger its organisational capacity θ:
d
dθ
(
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dc0
)
< 0.
In response to a shock to their autonomous marginal cost, firms can adjust their scope in
order to partially compensate the effects of the shock. In particular, as the magnitude of
the underlying shock increases, firms’ optimal adjustment strategy increasingly relies on this
external margin; as a consequence, the shock’s impact on induced marginal cost is mitigated.
Notice that part (iii) of Lemma 3 implies that firms with higher θ will experience a stronger
variation in firm size in response to the same shock to autonomous marginal cost. Accordingly,
the scope parameter θ is related to both firm size (see Lemma 2) and the size of adjustment.
With this in mind, we can now translate Lemma 3 in terms of observables.
Proposition 1 Consider the effect of a shock to a firm’s autonomous marginal cost c0.
(i) Large firms rely more on external adjustment than small firms. That is, they carry out a
larger fraction of overall adjustment via the creation or acquisition of plants (if expanding)
or via the closure or sale of plants (if contracting).
(ii) Large expansions and contractions are predominantly undertaken via external adjustment.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3 state that larger firms (those with higher θ) adjust the number of
plants more strongly in response to a given shock, but that changes in plant size (as determined
by c˜(c0, θ)) are the same across firms with different θs. It follows that a larger fraction of overall
adjustment must be carried out via the extensive margin at larger firms. Noting that θ is also
associated with higher overall adjustment (see Lemma 3, part (iii)), it also follows that higher
overall adjustment is associated with heavier reliance on external adjustment. Put differently,
the same shock to c0 generates relatively more external adjustment at firms with high θ, and
these are also the firms which react with more overall adjustment. In the data, we would thus
expect to see positive correlations between the extent of external adjustment, on the one hand,
and firm size and the magnitude of the overall adjustment, on the other hand.7 These are of
course our findings stated in stylised facts 3 and 4.
7If this is unclear, consider the following hypothetical calibration. We initially set c0 to the same value across
firms but choose different values for θ. We now shock c0 to the same extent across firms. But because firms
differ in terms of θ, the resulting change in firm size will be stronger for high-θ firms. In addition, these are the
firms which rely more heavily on external adjustment. Thus, in the data we observe that large firms and firms
with high overall adjustment (both characterised by a high θ) will rely more on external adjustment.
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Regarding stylised facts 1 and 2, note that, as a matter of convenience, our model formalises
n as a continuous variable. Hence, in equilibrium, firm adjustment always relies on both
the intensive and the extensive margin and there is no difference in the relative frequency
of adjustments along these margins. However, an appropriate reinterpretation for the case
of integer n immediately mends this problem. In this scenario, the existence of fixed costs
ρ of adding a plant would imply that there must be a minimum adjustment scale to make
external adjustment profitable. Accordingly, only adjustments in response to sufficiently large
technology shocks would result in external adjustment. Consequently, external adjustments
are rare (fact 1) but large on average (fact 2) compared to internal adjustments, as the latter
account for all adjustments to small shocks.
We conclude our analysis of the trade-off between internal and external adjustment channels
by discussing the robustness of our theoretical predictions. Our key assumption is to invoke a
span of control problem which gives rise to a trade-off between firm scope and profitability at
the firm’s individual plants. Following Nocke and Yeaple (2008), we choose to let this trade-off
originate on the supply side. Yet, our particular modelling approach is not without alternatives.
Firm-specific shocks could reflect shifts in demand rather than fluctuations in productivity; and
externalities across a firm’s plants could arise as a consequence of interactions on the demand
side instead of technology. However, alternative models along these lines would be largely
isomorphic to the framework we consider.
Thus, the linear demand system implied by the assumed quasi-linear preference structure in
(2) is not essential, but merely a convenient way of mapping marginal cost into demand and
thus plant and firm size. Similarly, the specific functional form of the marginal cost function
postulated in (3) does not matter for the gist of our results as long as it satisfies the properties
laid out in (4).8 That ∂c(n; c0, θ)/∂n > 0 is the manifestation of the presumed span of control
problem, while ∂c(n; c0, θ)/∂c0 > 0 allows for technology shocks to have an effect on marginal
cost, thus being the trigger for firms’ desire to adjust the scale and scope of their operations.
Finally, given ∂2c(n; c0, θ)/∂θ∂n < 0, firms with a strong capacity to coordinate multiple plants
(those with a high θ) have low production costs and also a low sensitivity of that cost to
variations in firm scope. The first property implies that these firms are large, while the second
property implies that their number of plants reacts very elastically to variations in autonomous
8Notice the following differences to related specifications employed in the literature. Ordering plants j ∈
[1, n], Eckel and Neary (2010) assume c(j; c0, θ) = c0 + jθ , implying that the negative scope effect of adding
another plant works only on the marginal plant rather than on the marginal and inframarginal plants. Nocke
and Yeaple (2008) assume c(n; c0, θ) = c0n1/θ, where 1/θ denotes the elasticity of marginal cost with respect
to the number of plants n, which is constant rather than variable. Based on this alternative specification, they
show that a firm’s optimal number of plants can be increasing so fast that induced marginal cost is actually
increasing in the firm’s organisational capability θ. But again, high-θ firms are large so that our main results
apply also for this setup.
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marginal cost. In other words, large firms frequently undertake large adjustments and choose
to do so via the external channels of adjustment.
3.3 External adjustment channels
A firm’s preferred channel of external adjustment, i.e., the decision between the creation or
closure of establishments (greenfield investments/divestitures) on the one hand and changes in
firm scope brought about by participation in the market for corporate control (M&As) on the
other hand, is determined such as to maximise the gains from such adjustment. In order to
examine the underlying trade-off, we first need to understand the valuation of plants.
3.3.1 Valuation of plants
Suppose each plant produces under constant returns to scale and has a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function, where α < 1
2
is the capital share in the production costs. The market value of
the plant and its assets is then given by
m˜(c˜(c0, θ)) ≡ P (x(c˜(c0, θ)))x(c˜(c0, θ))− (1− α)c˜(c0, θ)x(c˜(c0, θ))
=
1
2
[a− (1− 2α)c˜(c0, θ)] L
4
(a− c˜(c0, θ)),
where the first term is revenue from sales, while the second term corrects for the incurred labor
costs. It is also convenient to define the market value of the plant’s assets per unit of output
x(c˜(c0, θ)),
m(c˜(c0, θ)) ≡ m˜(c˜(c0, θ))
x(c˜(c0, θ))
=
1
2
[a− (1− 2α)c˜(c0, θ)] .
Notice that m(c˜(c0, θ)) is decreasing in marginal cost c˜(c0, θ). An individual plants’s assets are
composed of its physical capital as well as the property rights over the output it sells, which
are embodied in the fixed cost ρ of creating a new plant via greenfield investment. Accordingly,
the plant’s book value is given by
b(c˜(c0, θ)) ≡ αc˜(c0, θ)x(c˜(c0, θ)) + ρ = αc˜(c0, θ)L
4
(a− c˜(c0, θ)) + ρ,
where the first term is the book value of the capital used for production, while the second term
represents the fixed cost of greenfield investment. Notice that the book value per unit of output
x(c˜(c0, θ)) is increasing in marginal cost c˜(c0, θ). This is because we have exogeneously fixed
the price of capital to unity, and less productive firms need more capital to produce any given
quantity of output.
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3.3.2 The market for corporate control
The market for corporate control relocates capital from targets to acquirers, whereby the ac-
quirer incurs the fixed cost ρ from an acquisition as well as additional capital conversion costs
to be detailed below. In detail, we define an acquisition as the relocation of an individual target
plant to an acquirer.9 Heterogeneity in firms’ organisational capabilities gives rise to differences
in marginal costs across firms. Depending on the idiosyncratic cost shocks firms receive, they
may either want to keep their number of plants constant (no external adjustment) or alter-
natively adjust their scope by means of external adjustment. The latter firms which seek to
adjust externally, in turn, can do so by increasing or decreasing the number of their plants.
Accordingly, since a firm can never find it optimal to simultaneously act as a buyer and a seller,
the market for corporate control involves two disjoint sets of agents: potential acquirers and
potential targets.10
Formally, potential acquirers and potential targets interact in a two-sided matching game, de-
ciding whether and with whom to match. Since firms are risk-neutral and monetary transfers
in terms of an acquisition price paid by the acquirer to the target’s owner are possible and em-
pirically the norm, we assume that the surplus from an acquisition is fully transferable between
the transacting parties. An equilibrium in the matching game is described as a stable assign-
ment, that is, a profile of matches between acquirers and targets where (i) no matched agent
would prefer to remain unmatched, and (ii) there are no two (matched or unmatched) agents
who prefer to form a new alternative match. An important property of a stable assignment
under transferable utility is that it must maximise the total surplus over all possible assigments
(Becker, 1973; Shapley and Shubik, 1972).
Potential participants in the takeover market have always the option to stay out. Specifically,
firms that want to increase their number of plants can do so via greenfield expansion. When
setting up a new plant, they then face costs equal to the plant’s book value b(c˜(c0, θ)). Similarly,
contracting firms have the option of realizing a salvage value from disassembling existing capital
via plant closure. We assume that the salvage value is scaled by a factor λ < 1 relative to the
9Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that more than half of all M&As in the U.S. involve trade in individual
plants and divisions rather than entire corporations. Against this background, our subsequent analysis considers
plants (rather than firms) as the relevant units being transacted.
10Hence, we conceptualize M&As as ‘acquisitions’ rather than ‘mergers of equals’.
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plant’s book value net of the fixed cost ρ,11
λ [b(c˜(c0, θ))− ρ] = λαc˜(c0, θ)x(c˜(c0, θ)) = λαc˜(c0, θ)L
4
(a− c˜(c0, θ)).
By contrast, the payoffs for expanding or contracting firms which decide to participate in the
market for corporate control are endogenously determined by the matched acquirer-target pairs.
Matching on the market for corporate control is voluntary; that is, we abstract from hostile
takeovers by assuming that potential targets can repel unwanted bids.12
Let c˜i denote the induced marginal cost common to all plants in firm i, and let c˜ac denote
the marginal cost of a generic potential acquirer and c˜tt denote the marginal cost of a generic
potential target. Henceforth, we will simply identify particular plants via their marginal cost.
Given that there is a mass M of atomless firms subject to cost shocks, there is a continuum
of potential acquirers, whose marginal costs c˜ac we assume to be continuously distributed on[
c˜ac,m, c˜ac,M
]
according to some distribution F ac. Similarly, there is a continuum of potential
targets, whose marginal costs c˜tt are continuously distributed on
[
c˜tt,m, c˜tt,M
]
according to some
distribution F tt. For convenience, we assume that the distribution of idiosyncratic cost shocks
is such that the set of potential acquirers and the set of potential targets have equal measure.13
3.3.3 Capital conversion and surplus from M&A
Technology, as identified via induced marginal cost c˜i, is embodied in a firm’s capital. Hence,
technology is not perfectly mobile across firms. When considering the acquisition of a potential
target, a potential acquirer therefore faces capital conversion costs Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) which arise as a
consequence of converting type-c˜tt capital into capital that is in line with its own technology
c˜ac.14 We assume that the larger the technological gap between the acquirer and the target,
the higher the cost of converting inferior capital into more productive capital. Formally, the
conversion cost Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) is zero if c˜ac ≥ c˜tt, and increasing and strictly convex in the marginal
cost differential (c˜tt − c˜ac) if c˜ac < c˜tt:
∂Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac
< 0,
∂Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜tt
> 0,
∂2Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac∂c˜tt
< 0.
11Similar assumptions are also made in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Warusawitharana (2008). An-
alyzing equipment-level data from U.S. aerospace plants that closed during the 1990s, Ramey and Shapiro
(2001) find that, even after controlling for age-related depreciation, used capital sells at a substantial discount,
corresponding to λ = 0.75. Focusing on continuing plants, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) obtain somewhat
lower discounts, with λ ranging from 0.8 to 0.98. Warusawitharana (2008) calibrates λ = 0.98.
12In their study of mergers among publicly traded U.S. firms, Andrade et al. (2001) report that between 1973
and 1998 only 8.3% of all takeover bids were hostile and only 4.4% eventually succeeded. We do not explain
such mergers.
13Our subsequent results generalise to the case of unequal measures (results available from the authors upon
request).
14For a similar assumption, see Han and Rousseau (2009).
21
A necessary condition for an M&A transaction relocating capital from a target (c˜tt) to an
acquirer (c˜ac) to take place is that there are (absolute) gains from it,
H(c˜ac, c˜tt) =
[
m(c˜ac)−m(c˜tt)]x(c˜tt)− [Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) + χ(c˜ac; cac0 , θac)− χ(c˜tt; ctt0 , θtt)]− ρ, (11)
where the first term captures the direct gains from relocating production capacity from the
target to the acquirer. These gains must be weighed against the fixed cost ρ of the transaction
and another term, which captures the conversion costs as well as the within-firm externalities
arising from the inframarginal cost effect. Specifically, the acquirer’s plants are subject to
increased marginal cost, while the plants retained by the target firm benefit from reduced
marginal cost.15
In what follows, we proceed under the assumption that the inframarginal cost differential is
small relative to the fixed cost ρ, implying that ρ + [χ(c˜ac; cac0 , θ
ac)− χ(c˜tt; ctt0 , θtt)] ≥ 0. It is
then evident from (11) that the existence of gains from an M&A transaction necessarily requires
that m(c˜ac)−m(c˜tt) ≥ 0, or equivalently,
c˜ac ≤ c˜tt. (12)
However, since an acquirer’s and a target’s plants generally produce different quantities, x(c˜ac) 6=
x(c˜tt), the transacted plant’s post-acquisition size must be adjusted via internal investment.
Hence, the gross surplus generated from relocating a plant via M&A followed by internal ad-
justment to bring it to its efficient post-acquisition scale x(c˜ac) is
G(c˜ac, c˜tt) =
[
m(c˜ac)−m(c˜tt)]x(c˜tt)− [Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) + χ(c˜ac; cac0 , θac)− χ(c˜tt; ctt0 , θtt)]− ρ
+ [m(c˜ac)− αc˜ac] [x(c˜ac)− x(c˜tt)] .
Similarly, we define the relevant outside options for the parties in the market for corporate
control. For a potential acquirer, the payoff from remaining unmatched on the merger market
and expanding by greenfield investment at scale x(c˜ac) is
G(c˜ac, 0) = [m(c˜ac)− αc˜ac]x(c˜ac)− χ(c˜ac; cac0 , θac)− ρ.
For a potential target, the payoff from remaining unmatched on the merger market and con-
tracting via the sale of disembodied used capital is
G(0, c˜tt) =
[
λαc˜tt −m(c˜tt)]x(c˜tt) + χ(c˜tt; ctt0 , θtt).
15Notice that the monetary transaction price paid by the acquirer does not appear in (11) because it simply
redistributes resources between the acquirer and the target and thus does not affect their joint gains; this is an
implication of our assumption of transferable utility.
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We are now ready to define the net surplus – relative to the parties’ outside options – created
by an acquisition:
∆(c˜ac, c˜tt) ≡ G(c˜ac, c˜tt)−G(c˜ac, 0)−G(0, c˜tt) = [αc˜ac − λαc˜tt]x(c˜tt)− Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt). (13)
Accordingly, the net surplus from an acquisition is given by the net benefit per unit multiplied
by the transaction size as measured by the production capacity of the transacted plant, net
of the incurred cost of capital conversion. The net benefit per unit, in turn, is given by the
difference between the acquirer’s benefit from economising on the purchase price of new capital
via greenfield expansion and the target’s opportunity cost due to the foregone salvage value
from plant closure.16 For an acquirer-target match to be viable, it must generate a surplus
∆(c˜ac, c˜tt) ≥ 0. This is the case if the transaction generates a non-negative net benefit, a
necessary condition for which is
c˜ac ≥ λc˜tt. (14)
3.3.4 The stable assignment
Taken together, conditions (12) and (14) imply
c˜tt ≥ c˜ac ≥ λc˜tt. (15)
In other words, the market for corporate control relocates capital from high cost firms to low
cost firms,17 but the cost differential between the matched firms cannot be too large. It is
worth emphasizing that this last property does not hinge on the existence of capital conversion
costs; instead, gains from trade on the market for corporate control arise as a consequence of
the discount for the sale of disembodied used capital (λ < 1).
The remainder of this section is concerned with the scenario where c˜ac,m < c˜tt,m ≤ 1
λ
c˜ac,M
holds. As shown in Appendix B.5, this restriction is a necessary condition for the coexistence
of M&A and greenfield investment along the stable assignment on the market for corporate
control (in other words, there is scope for gains from adjustment via both external adjustment
channels). Given that we do indeed observe such a coexistence in our data, the restriction seems
16Notice that inframarginal cost considerations have cancelled out in the derivation of (13) and thus are
irrelevant in the context of our analysis of external adjustment: The inframarginal cost effect matters for the
determination of firm scope and hence for the selection of firms into external adjustment activity (Section
3.2). However, since inframarginal cost considerations are equally relevant for variations of firm scope via both
available channels of external adjustment, they do not matter for the selection of firms into greenfield versus
M&A activity.
17That capital flows from high cost firms to low cost firms is the basic prediction of the ‘Q-theory of mergers’
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002).
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reasonable. We now seek to examine the characteristics of the potential acquirers and targets
who are matched on the market for corporate control or instead remain unmatched and engage
in greenfield expansions/contractions. To that end, the properties of the surplus function (13)
are crucial.
Notice that (13) denotes the joint surplus a potential acquirer and a potential target can
realize by undertaking an acquisition, but does not describe the division of the surplus among
the two parties. Because a stable assignment under transferable utility must maximise the
total surplus over all possible assignments, the first-order derivatives of the surplus function
∆(c˜ac, c˜tt) determine which firms are matched or remain unmatched, while the cross derivative
determines which acquirer is matched to which target (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). In the
context of our model, the following pattern applies. The partial derivative with respect to the
acquirer’s marginal cost is
∂∆(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac
= αx(c˜tt)− ∂Γ(c˜
ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac
> 0.
Given c˜tt, an increase in c˜ac raises the net benefit per unit of production capacity transacted in
an acquisition. The reason behind this property are the increased savings from an acquisition
relative to the alternative of greenfield expansion for high cost acquirers. In addition, given c˜tt,
an increase in c˜ac reduces the incurred conversion costs Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt).
By contrast, the sign of the partial derivative with respect to the target’s marginal cost is
∂∆(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜tt
= −λαx(c˜tt) + [αc˜ac − λαc˜tt] ∂x(c˜tt)
∂c˜tt
− ∂Γ(c˜
ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜tt
< 0.
Thus, given c˜ac, an increase in c˜tt reduces the net surplus generated from an acquisition. This is
because (i) the outside option of greenfield contraction is more attractive for high cost targets,
and (ii) acquirers face higher conversion costs when integrating them. Moreover, the induced
reduction in the transaction size x(c˜tt) has an additional negative effect.
Finally, the cross derivative of the surplus function (13) is
∂2∆(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac∂c˜tt
= α
∂x(c˜tt)
∂c˜tt
− ∂
2Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac∂c˜tt
. (16)
The sign of the cross derivative depends on the relative magnitude of the two terms in (16)
both of which are negative. It is therefore useful to start from the benchmark where conversion
costs are absent, i.e., Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) = 0 globally. In this case (16) degenerates to
∂2∆(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac∂c˜tt
|Γ=0 = α∂x(c˜
tt)
∂c˜tt
< 0.
The negative sign of the cross derivative indicates substitutability between the individual char-
acteristics of an acquirer-target match. This reflects the fact that the increase in the surplus
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from an acquisition due to an increase in c˜ac increases in the transaction size as measured by
the acquired plant’s capacity x(c˜tt), which, in turn, is decreasing in c˜tt. Therefore, absent con-
version costs, the surplus maximizing assignment on the market for corporate control should
generate a profile of matches such that larger transactions occur for acquirer-target pairs with
a higher net benefit αc˜ac − λαc˜tt per unit transacted.
However, the presence of conversion costs may twist this result. Intuitively, the fact that
Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) is increasing and convex in the difference (c˜tt−c˜ac) punishes potential matches between
technologically distant partners, i.e., mergers that would otherwise generate the highest gains.
Indeed, the conversion costs may increase so fast in the cost differential such as to dominate
the advantageous effect discussed above. Specifically, if
− ∂
2Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt)
∂c˜ac∂c˜tt
> −α∂x(c˜
tt)
∂c˜tt
= α
L
4
, (17)
the cross derivative (13) becomes positive. In this case, the surplus maximizing assignment
involves a profile of matches where larger transactions occur between technologically similar
firms.
Lemma 4 Under sufficiently convex conversion costs, such that (17) holds, the stable assign-
ment on the market for corporate control is positive assortative. Otherwise, the stable assign-
ment on the market for corporate control is negative assortative.
Assortative matching is a direct implication of the fact that aggregate surplus must be maxi-
mized in a stable assignment. Lemma 4 states that sufficiently convex conversion costs Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt)
are necessary to generate a stable assignment with positive assortative matching. The empirical
evidence presented in Section 2 shows that the UK merger market displays a pattern of positive
assortative acquirer-target matches. Against this background, we therefore proceed to examine
the case where the conversion costs satisfy (17). The following lemma examines this scenario
in greater detail.
Lemma 5 Suppose c˜ac,m < c˜tt,m ≤ 1
λ
c˜ac,M such that both greenfield adjustment and acquisitions
can potentially coexist as part of the stable assignment on the market for corporate control.
Suppose further that the capital conversion costs Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) are sufficiently convex such that
(17) holds.
(i) If acquisitions do not occur as part of the stable assignment, then c˜ac,M < c˜tt,m and
conversion costs must be sufficiently strong.
(ii) If c˜tt,m ≤ c˜ac,M , acquisitions occur as part of the stable assignment.
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(a) The minimum cost match (cac, ctt) is formed by the potential target with the lowest
marginal cost, ctt = c˜tt,m, and its acquirer with weakly lower marginal cost, cac ≤
c˜tt,m.
(b) If c˜ac,M ≤ c˜tt,M , the maximum cost match (c¯ac, c¯tt) is formed by the potential acquirer
with the highest marginal cost, c¯ac = c˜ac,M , and its target with weakly higher marginal
cost, c¯tt ≥ c˜ac,M . Otherwise, if c˜ac,M > c˜tt,M , the maximum cost match (c¯ac, c¯tt) is
formed by c¯ac = c˜tt,M and its target with identical marginal cost c¯tt = c˜tt,M .
(c) Potential targets c˜tt ∈ [ctt, c¯tt] are taken over by potential acquirers c˜ac ∈ [cac, c¯ac],
whereby matching is positive assortative and the market for corporate control clears,
F tt(c¯tt)− F tt(ctt) = F ac(c¯ac)− F ac(cac).
All other firms adjust via greenfield contraction or expansion.
According to Lemma 5, the market for corporate control matches a subset of the externally
adjusting firms into acquirer-target pairs. Specifically, the potential target with the lowest
marginal cost, c˜tt,m, is always matched, while potential targets with very high marginal cost
(those with c˜tt > c¯tt) adjust via greenfield disinvestment, i.e., plant closures and subsequent
sales of disembodied used capital. On the other side of the market, the potential acquirer with
the highest marginal cost, c˜ac,M , is matched provided there exists a viable target c˜tt ≥ c˜ac,M ;
potential acquirers with very low marginal cost (those with c˜ac < cac) adjust via greenfield
expansions instead. Throughout, acquisitions relocate capital from targets to acquirers with
weakly lower marginal cost, and the pattern of acquirer-target matches is positive assortative,
such that high cost targets are absorbed by high cost acquirers (‘like-buys-like’).
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the properties of the stable assignment on the market for cor-
porate control. Matched targets and acquirers can be identified in terms of their marginal cost.
In the empirically relevant case where both M&As and greenfield investment are observed, the
stable assignment matches potential acquirers with sufficiently high marginal cost, but rations
those with low marginal cost. As explained above, the surplus from matching on the market for
corporate control relative the outside option of greenfield investment is increasing in a potential
acquirer’s marginal cost. The key mechanism behind this result is that less productive firms
face higher costs of greenfield expansion because they need to purchase a larger quantity of
physical capital. Similarly, potential targets with sufficiently low marginal cost are matched,
but rationing happens for high cost firms. This reflects the fact that the outside option of con-
tracting via sales of used capital is less attractive for low cost firms who sell only a relatively
small quantity of physical capital.
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Figure 1: Stable assignment on the market for corporate control
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3.3.5 Link to stylised facts 5-8
We conclude this section by restating our results in terms of observables: firm size and the
magnitude of adjustment. In contrast to our previous analysis, we now stress cross-sectional
heterogeneity in the autonomous cost parameter c0. We do so for two reasons. First, as
explained in Lemma 5, firms’ external adjustment behaviour is determined by their marginal
cost, and by Lemma 1, dc˜(c0, θ)/dθ = 0; so cross-sectional heterogeneity in marginal cost arises
only as a consequence of heterogeneity in c0. Second, even in a more general environment
where dc˜(c0, θ)/dθ 6= 0, the effective heterogeneity in θ is reduced by a selection effect: Since
the decision to adjust externally in response to a cost shock selects high-θ firms, while low-θ
firms prefer to adjust internally, the remaining variation in θ across firms undertaking external
adjustment (the focus of this section) is likely to be lower than the variation in c0.
18 Since
dS(c˜(c0, θ))/dc0 < 0 (Lemma 2), we then conclude that high cost firms are small in terms of
their aggregate sales turnover.
Proposition 2 Consider the set of externally adjusting firms.
(i) Among the potential acquirers, large firms are more likely to expand by greenfield invest-
ment, while small firms are more likely to expand by plant acquisition (M&A).
(ii) Among the potential targets, small firms are more likely to contract via plant closure,
while large firms are more likely to contract by plant sale (M&A).
(iii) Acquisitions relocate capital from small firms to weakly larger firms, whereby larger targets
sell plants to larger acquirers (positive assortative matching).
(iv) Large transactions are more likely to proceed via M&A rather than greenfield adjustment.
The first three parts of Proposition 2 reformulate results from Lemma 5. Finally, the last part
of Proposition 2 provides a prediction concerning the relationship between transaction size and
the preferred mode of external adjustment. Inspection of the surplus function (13) indicates
that the gains from M&A adjustment relative to greenfield adjustment are determined by,
among other things, the transaction size, x(c˜tt). Specifically, a marginal increase in transaction
size increases the surplus of a given acquirer-target match by the amount [αc˜ac − λαc˜tt] > 0.
Ceteris paribus, therefore, larger transactions are more likely to proceed via M&A rather than
greenfield adjustment.19 This is consistent with stylised fact 6.
18This is true if the initial variation in θ is not substantially larger and/or the correlation between θ and c0
is not too high.
19Formally, this follows from ∂∆(c˜
ac,c˜tt)
∂c˜tt < 0.
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Recall that marginal cost determines not only firm size but also factor demand. Specifically,
less productive firms require more capital to produce any given quantity of output. Therefore,
when trading off the two channels of external adjustment, the motive of economising on the
purchase price of new capital is more important for small (i.e., high cost) potential acquirers.
As a consequence, these firms are more likely to undertake an acquisition, while large potential
acquirers tend to expand via greenfield investment (fact 5).
A similar trade-off is operative on the contraction side, where our model predicts a positive
correlation between firm size and the likelihood of the contraction to happen via plant sale
(M&A). This is the one prediction where our model is at odds with our earlier evidence –
recall that we concluded that there is no link between firm size and the choice of external
adjustment channel for contractions (fact 5). One explanation, which is admittedly favourable
to our model, is that the variation in (adverse) idiosyncratic cost shocks on the target side is
too small to yield detectable differences in contraction behaviour. Another explanation is that
additional factors play a role in firms’ decision behaviour, which are absent from our model.
For example, it could be that antitrust authorities are generally less inclined to permit the
acquisition of larger firms because of the resulting increase in market power of the acquirer
(this increase would of course be lower for acquisitions of smaller firms).
As pointed out above, gains from trade on the market for corporate control arise as a conse-
quence of the discount for the sale of disembodied used capital (λ < 1). Our model shares this
aspect with other models in the tradition of the Q-theory of mergers. Similar to those models,
our theory also predicts that the market for corporate control relocates capital from less to more
productive firms. Since more productive firms are larger, this is consistent with stylised fact
8. Different from the basic Q-theory of mergers, though, our model also predicts the pattern
of matches on the market for corporate control to be positive assortative. This ‘like-buys-like’
aspect of M&A transactions corresponds to stylised fact 7. A critical assumption to generate
such positive assortative pattern is the existence of capital conversion costs, which put a bound
on the technological gap for a viable acquirer-target pair.20
20Finally note that one implication of our model for empirical analysis is that the decision between the three
adjustment forms should be modelled as a two-tier structure. First, firms choose between internal and external
adjustment; and second, they choose between greenfield and M&A investment. This is of course the estimation
strategy we have pursued in one of our earlier robustness checks (see footnote 3 and Table A4). As seen there,
a two-tier approach yields very similar results to the one-tier approach we used earlier.
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4 Conclusions
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of how firms choose between different expansion
and contraction forms. Using novel data covering almost the entire universe of UK firms between
1997 and 2005, we have documented firms’ use of internal adjustment, greenfield investment and
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We have described frequency and aggregate importance of
the different channels, and have shown that their use varies systematically with two observable
firm characteristics, firm size and the magnitude of adjustment. We have also examined the
pattern of matches formed on the market for corporate control, demonstrating that larger firms
buy smaller firms and that there is positive assortative matching on the UK merger market.
Based on these facts, we have proposed a theoretical framework which accommodates all three
adjustment channels in a unified setting, and is able to replicate the adjustment and matching
patterns found in the data. The key features of the model are a span of control problem,
which gives rise to a trade-off between firm scope and productivity, and the existence of capital
conversion costs, which prevent M&As between potential partners that are technologically too
distant.
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A Additional Details on Data Construction
In this appendix, we discuss two more technical aspects of the BSD which are relevant for our
analysis. The first one concerns the appropriate level of aggregation. As discussed in Section
2.1, the BSD captures the ownership structure of firms, plants and business sites using different
aggregation categories. Besides the two categories used in our analysis, the enterprise and
the enterprise group, the BSD also contains a third category, the so-called local unit. The
ONS defines these three categories as follows (ONS, 2006). An enterprise “is the smallest
combination of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which
benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of
its current resources”. An enterprise group is “an association of enterprises bound together
by legal and/or financial links”. Finally, a local unit is “an enterprise or part thereof (e.g., a
workshop, factory, warehouse or office) situated in a geographically identified place”.
Similar to enterprises and enterprise groups, each local unit is allocated a unique reference num-
ber upon entry into the IDBR, and the ONS maintains a list of local units for each enterprise.
Thus, in principle, our methodology for computing demographic events described in Section
2.1 can be implemented at different levels of aggregation. As discussed, in this paper we take
the enterprise group as the decision-making unit and analyse how it changes turnover through
adjustments at its existing enterprises and the acquisition/sale or creation/closure of new ones.
In our view, the enterprise group is a natural choice for the upper level of our analysis, given
that many of the expansion and contraction decisions we are interested in here are of first-order
importance to a firm and are likely to be made centrally and at the highest level of a firm.21
Another reason for working at the enterprise group/enterprise level (rather than at the enter-
prise group/local unit or enterprise/local unit level) is that there are a number of important
data issues related to the local unit level of the BSD. First, the local unit structure of enterprises
is updated much less frequently than the links between enterprise groups and enterprises, in
particular for smaller enterprises.22 This makes an implementation of the above methodology
problematic, in particular when looking at year-to-year changes in ownership structure, as we
21This is particularly true for the two external forms of adjustment, greenfield investment and M&As. While
enterprises are defined above as “benefiting from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making in the alloca-
tion of current resources”, this definition does not include strategic investment decisions such as the acquisition
or the opening up of new plants or operations.
22See ONS (2001, 2003) and Jones (2000, p.51). The local unit structure of enterprises is updated through
the Annual Register Inquiry (ARI) which samples large enterprises (100 or more employees before 2003, 50 in
later years) every year but only one in four of medium-sized enterprises (20-99 and 20-49 employees before and
after 2003, respectively). For smaller enterprises, updating takes place on an ad-hoc basis only. In contrast, the
ownership information linking the enterprise group and the enterprise level is updated at least once a year (see
Dun & Bradstreet, 2001; ONS, 2006).
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do in this paper. Second, most enterprises with multiple local units only report information on
turnover and employment at the enterprise level, preventing the implementation of our method-
ology at the local unit level for these enterprises (see Criscuolo et al., 2003). Finally, local unit
identifiers are considered by the ONS to be less stable over time than enterprise identifiers
(ONS, 2006). That is, local units sometimes change their identifiers even though no corporate
event has occurred, creating problems of false exit in our methodology.
A second important issue concerns the choice of variable to measure enterprise group size and
size changes in our analysis. At the enterprise level, the BSD contains employment and turnover
information (from PAYE and VAT records, respectively). At first glance, employment might
seem to be a better indicator of enterprise group size changes as the number of employees is more
directly under the control of a firm. Again, however, data quality makes us opt for turnover.
This is because employment information for smaller enterprises in the BSD is updated less
regularly than turnover information.23 Using employment data as a size change indicator would
thus lead to an underestimate of the importance of internal adjustment relative to external
adjustment. We note, however, that this issue does not seem to matter much in practice.
As we demonstrate in unreported results (available from the authors upon request), all of
the qualitative results in this paper go through when using employment rather than turnover
information.
B Theoretical Appendix
B.1 The linear demand system
See Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Since the choice of the number of plants enters (7) only through the induced marginal cost
c˜(c0, θ) ≡ c(n(c0, θ); c0, θ), the optimal determination of firm scope can equivalently be for-
23See Criscuolo et al. (2003) and ONS (2001) for details. While turnover is updated continuously from VAT
sources, employment is frozen at the point at which an enterprise arrives on the IDBR. Afterwards, it is only
updated through the ARI which mainly covers larger enterprises (see footnote 23). ONS (2001) reports that in
the year 2000, enterprises accounting for close to 10% of employment had not had their employment information
updated since the Census of Employment in 1993.
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malised in terms of choosing c˜(c0, θ) rather than n. Hence, (7) can be rewritten as
Ψ(c˜(c0, θ)) = [P (x(c˜(c0, θ)))− c˜(c0, θ)]x(c˜(c0, θ))− ρ− c˜(c0, θ) log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
x(c˜(c0, θ))
=
L
8
(a− c˜(c0, θ))2 − ρ− c˜(c0, θ) log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
L
4
(a− c˜(c0, θ)) = 0. (B.1)
From (8), Ψ(c0e
1/θ) = L
8
(a − c0e1/θ)2 − ρ > 0. Moreover, Ψ(a) = −ρ < 0. Since Ψ(c) is
continuous, this implies that there exists a c˜(c0, θ) such that Ψ(c˜(c0, θ)) = 0. We claim that
c˜(c0, θ) is unique. To see this, notice that Ψ(c˜(c0, θ)) = 0 and ρ > 0 imply
L
8
(a − c˜(c0, θ))2 −
c˜(c0, θ) log
(
c˜(c0,θ)
c0
)
L
4
(a− c˜(c0, θ)) > 0 and thus
(a− c˜(c0, θ))− 2c˜(c0, θ) log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
> 0. (B.2)
Taking the partial derivative of Ψ(c˜(c0, θ)) with respect to c yields
Ψc(c˜(c0, θ)) = −L
4
[
(a− c˜(c0, θ))
(
2 + log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
))
− c˜(c0, θ) log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)]
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from (B.2). The uniqueness of c˜(c0, θ) now follows from
Ψc(c˜(c0, θ)) < 0.
We next show that dc˜(c0,θ)
dc0
> 0 and dc˜(c0,θ)
dθ
= 0. The claimed results follow from total differen-
tiation of (B.1), which implies
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
=
(a− c˜(c0, θ)) c˜(c0,θ)c0[
(a− c˜(c0, θ))
(
2 + log
(
c˜(c0,θ)
c0
))
− c˜(c0, θ) log
(
c˜(c0,θ)
c0
)] > 0, (B.3)
where the inequality again follows from (B.2), and
dc˜(c0, θ)
dθ
= 0. (B.4)
From the specification of marginal cost in (3), c˜(c0, θ) = c0e
n/θ, and thus
n(c0, θ) = θ log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
. (B.5)
Notice that n(c0, θ) ≥ 1 implies c˜(c0, θ) ≥ c0e1/θ. From (B.5),
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
=
θ
c0
(εc˜(c0)− 1) < 0, (B.6)
where εc˜(c0) ≡ dc˜(c0,θ)dc0 c0c˜(c0,θ) . From (B.3), it follows that 0 < εc˜(c0) < 1 and hence
dn(c0,θ)
dc0
< 0.
Similarly, from (B.5) and using (B.4),
dn(c0, θ)
dθ
= log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
> 0.
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
From (10), a firm’s aggregate sales are
S(c˜(c0, θ)) ≡ n(c0, θ)s(c˜(c0, θ)) = θ log
(
c˜(c0, θ)
c0
)
L
8
(
a2 − c˜(c0, θ)2
)
. (B.7)
We first show that S(c˜(c0, θ)) is decreasing in c0. From (B.7),
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dc0
=
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
s(c˜(c0, θ)) + n(c0, θ)
ds(c˜(c0, θ))
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
< 0, (B.8)
where the inequality follows from dn(c0, θ)/dc0 < 0, ds(c˜(c0, θ))/dc˜(c0, θ) < 0 and dc˜(c0, θ)/dc0 >
0.
Next, we show that S(c˜(c0, θ)) is increasing in θ. Again, from (B.7),
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dθ
=
dn(c0, θ)
dθ
s(c˜(c0, θ)) + n(c0, θ)
ds(c˜(c0, θ))
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc˜(c0, θ)
dθ
> 0, (B.9)
where the inequality follows from dn(c0, θ)/dθ > 0, ds(c˜(c0, θ))/dc˜(c0, θ) < 0 and dc˜(c0, θ)/dθ =
0.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Recall (B.6),
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
=
θ
c0
(εc˜(c0)− 1) < 0.
We claim that the absolute value of dn(c0, θ)/dc0 is increasing in θ. To see this, notice that
d
dθ
(
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
)
=
1
c0
(εc˜(c0)− 1) + θ
c0
d
dθ
(εc˜(c0)) < 0. (B.10)
The first summand is negative, since 0 < εc˜(c0) < 1. The second summand is zero, since
dc˜(c0, θ)/dθ = 0.
Next, recall (B.3),
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
=
(a− c˜(c0, θ)) c˜(c0,θ)c0[
(a− c˜(c0, θ))
(
2 + log
(
c˜(c0,θ)
c0
))
− c˜(c0, θ) log
(
c˜(c0,θ)
c0
)] > 0.
We claim that dc˜(c0, θ)/dc0 is constant in θ. To see this, notice that
d
dθ
(
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
)
= 0, (B.11)
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which follows immediately from the fact that dc˜(c0, θ)/dθ = 0 established in (B.4).
Finally, recall (B.8),
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dc0
=
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
s(c˜(c0, θ)) + n(c0, θ)
ds(c˜(c0, θ))
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
< 0.
Hence,
d
dθ
(
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dc0
)
=
d
dθ
(
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
)
s(c˜(c0, θ)) +
dn(c0, θ)
dc0
ds(c˜(c0, θ))
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc˜(c0, θ)
dθ
+
dn(c0, θ)
dθ
ds(c˜(c0, θ))
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
+ n(c0, θ)
ds(c˜(c0, θ))
dc˜(c0, θ)
d
dθ
(
dc˜(c0, θ)
dc0
)
.
By Lemma 1, dc˜(c0,θ)
dc0
> 0, dn(c0,θ)
dc0
< 0, dc˜(c0,θ)
dθ
= 0, dn(c0,θ)
dθ
> 0; by (B.10) and (B.11),
d
dθ
(
dn(c0,θ)
dc0
)
< 0 and d
dθ
(
dc˜(c0,θ)
dc0
)
= 0; finally, ds(c˜(c0,θ))
dc˜(c0,θ)
< 0. Together, these results estab-
lish that
d
dθ
(
dS(c˜(c0, θ))
dc0
)
< 0.
B.5 Coexistence of greenfield adjustment and M&A along the stable
assignment
It is convenient to formalise the description of the stable assignment on the market for corporate
control in terms of the matching function Φ mating a given acquirer c˜ac to its target Φ(c˜ac),
where Φ(c˜ac) = 0 means that the acquirer expands via greenfield investment; whenever Φ(c˜ac) 6=
0, we say that c˜ac is matched to a target and thus expands via M&A.
As a consequence of condition (15), viable matches must satisfy Φ(c˜ac) ∈ [c˜ac, 1
λ
c˜ac
]
. This
observation leads to the following lemma, which infers necessary and sufficient conditions for
the occurrence of M&A along the stable assignment on the market for corporate control.
Lemma 6 The stable assignment on the market for corporate control can only involve acqui-
sitions if
c˜tt,m ≤ 1
λ
c˜ac,M and c˜ac,m ≤ c˜tt,M . (B.12)
The stable assignment on the market for corporate control must involve acquisitions if
c˜tt,m ≤ c˜ac,M and c˜ac,m ≤ c˜tt,M . (B.13)
Lemma 6 places a restriction on the support of the cost distributions F ac and F tt. If condition
(B.12) does not hold, then firms will rely exclusively on greenfield activity to realise their desired
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external adjustment. There is no potential for gains from trade via M&A, and regardless of
their characteristics or exposure to cost shocks, firms will choose greenfield investment and plant
closures as their preferred mode of external adjustment. On the other hand, if (B.12) holds such
that F tt has positive mass in
[
c˜ac,m, 1
λ
c˜ac,M
]
, then gains from trade emerge and the nature of
the capital conversion costs Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) determines whether some firms will achieve their desired
external adjustment by means of M&A. Finally, if F tt has positive mass in
[
c˜ac,m, c˜ac,M
]
as
stipulated by condition (B.13), then there is scope for M&A transactions that do not incur any
capital conversion costs: namely via matches where Φ(c˜ac) = c˜ac such that ∆(c˜ac,Φ(c˜ac)) > 0.
This immediately implies that acquisitions must be part of the surplus maximising stable
assignment.
Indeed, given the existence of conversion costs, there is a tendency for matches to form along
the 45◦ line, i.e., Φ(c˜ac) = c˜ac. Since matches of this type are not subject to conversion costs, the
surplus function (13) is unambigously positive: ∆(c˜ac,Φ(c˜ac)) > 0 for all c˜ac = Φ(c˜ac) ∈ (0, a).
Hence, the stable assignment on the market for corporate control can only involve greenfield
adjustment if market conditions prevent matches of the type Φ(c˜ac) = c˜ac to form globally.
This observation leads to another lemma, which infers necessary and sufficient conditions for
the occurrence of greenfield expansions along the stable assignment on the market for corporate
control.
Lemma 7 The stable assignment on the market for corporate control can only involve greenfield
investment if
c˜ac,m < c˜tt,m or c˜tt,M < c˜ac,M . (B.14)
The stable assignment on the market for corporate control must involve greenfield investment if
c˜ac,m < λc˜tt,m or c˜tt,M < c˜ac,M , (B.15)
or if (B.14) holds and capital conversion costs Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt) are sufficiently strong.
Recall that cost shocks give rise to the need for external adjustment. Moreover, the set of
potential acquirers is given by those firms that received an advantageous cost shock which
reduces their induced marginal cost. Conversely, the set of potential targets was exposed to
adverse cost shocks which increase their induced marginal cost. In view of these considerations,
the first condition in (B.14) is likely to be satisfied, while the second condition is less likely to
hold.
Therefore, focusing on the first condition in (B.14), Lemmas 6 and 7 together imply that a
necessary condition for the coexistence of M&A and greenfield investment is
c˜ac,m < c˜tt,m ≤ 1
λ
c˜ac,M .
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Finally notice that, given this condition, the scope for greenfield activity increases in the
strength of the capital conversion costs Γ(c˜ac, c˜tt).
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Assortative matching follows directly from the fact that aggregate surplus must be maximised
in a stable assignment, and the sign of (16) determines whether matching is positive or negative
assortative.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 5
(i) If c˜ac,m < c˜tt,m ≤ c˜ac,M , then there is a potential acquirer with marginal cost c˜ac = c˜tt,m
who can match with c˜tt,m without incurring conversion costs, implying ∆(c˜ac, c˜tt,m) > 0.
So the stable assignment must involve acquisitions.
If c˜ac,M < c˜tt,m ≤ 1
λ
c˜ac,M , then there is no potential acquirer who can match with c˜tt,m
without incurring conversion costs, but there are potential acquirers with marginal cost
c˜ac such that c˜tt,m ∈ [c˜ac, 1
λ
c˜ac
]
. To prevent such matches, conversion costs must be
sufficiently strong.
(ii) (a) Since c˜tt,m ≤ c˜ac,M , the stable assignment involves acquisitions. Let ctt be the
potential target with the lowest marginal cost among all matched targets. Since
c˜ac,m < c˜tt,m and ∂∆(c˜ac, c˜tt)/∂c˜tt < 0, it follows that ctt = c˜tt,m (since any al-
ternative lowest match could be broken). Finally, from condition (15), it follows
that ctt = c˜tt,m is matched to an acquirer with weakly lower marginal cost cac ∈
[max {c˜ac,m, λc˜tt,m} , c˜tt,m].
(b) Since c˜tt,m ≤ c˜ac,M , the stable assignment involves acquisitions. Let c¯tt be the po-
tential target with the highest marginal cost among all matched targets.
Suppose first c˜ac,M ≤ c˜tt,M . Then, since ∂∆(c˜ac, c˜tt)/∂c˜ac > 0, it follows that the
potential acquirer with marginal cost c˜ac = min
{
c¯tt, c˜ac,M
}
must be matched (since
any alternative highest match could be broken). But from condition (15), it follows
that c¯tt must be matched to an acquirer with weakly lower marginal cost, which
implies c˜ac,M ≤ c¯tt. Hence, c¯ac = c˜ac,M is matched and takes over a target with
weakly higher marginal cost c¯tt ∈ [c˜ac,M ,min{ 1
λ
c˜ac,M , c˜tt,M
}]
.
Suppose next c˜ac,M > c˜tt,M . Then, since c¯tt ≤ c˜tt,M < c˜ac,M and ∂∆(c˜ac, c˜tt)/∂c˜ac > 0,
it follows that the potential acquirer with marginal cost c˜ac = c¯tt must be matched
(since any alternative highest match could be broken). Hence, the highest match
must lie on the 45◦ line and does not incur any conversion costs, implying ∆(c¯ac, c¯tt) >
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0. But then c¯tt = c˜tt,M < c˜ac,M , for otherwise there could form other viable matches
along the 45◦ line with c˜ac = c˜tt > c¯tt, which contradicts the fact that c¯tt is the
potential target with the highest marginal cost among all matched targets. Hence,
c¯ac = c˜tt,M is matched and takes over a target with identical marginal cost c¯tt = c˜tt,M .
(c) Follows directly from (a) and (b) and Lemma 4.
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics, Adjustment Strategies (1997-2005) 
 
 Internal 
adjustment M&A Greenfield All adjustments 
Panel A: Usage Frequency of Adjustment Channels (%, total count in last column) 
Gross expansions 99.84% 0.50% 0.20% 5,044,793 
Gross 
contractions 99.56% 0.66% 0.44% 3,600,784 
Panel B: Average Size of Adjustment by Cannel Channels (£000s) 
Gross expansions 882.4 34831.7 11108.2 1070.6 
Gross 
contractions 1143.4 34164.1 37325.0 1520.1 
Panel C: Aggregate Importance of Adjustment Channels (% of total adjustment) 
Gross expansions 81.77% 16.10% 2.01% £776 bill. 
Gross 
contractions 74.41% 14.83% 10.80% £787 bill. 
Source: ONS and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of all turnover adjustments involving internal adjustment, M&As 
and greenfield investment or disinvestment. Panel B shows the average transaction size of each of 
these channels, and Panel C their contribution to overall adjustment. All figures are averages over 
1997-2005. Turnover is measured in ‘000s GBP in constant 1995 prices, using 2-digit sectoral output 
price deflators from the EUKLEMS project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Gross Expansion and Contraction in Turnover by Size of Firm (1997-2005)  
 
  A) Expansions in Turnover B) Contractions in Turnover 
Size 
Category  
of Firm 
Size 
(£’000s) 
Internal 
Adjustment 
(%) 
M&A 
(%) 
Greenfiel
d 
(%) 
Internal 
Adjustment 
(%) 
M&A 
(%) 
Greenfiel
d 
(%) 
Bottom 50% 0-152 99.94 0.05 0.01 99.95 0.03 0.02 
51% to 75% 153-342 99.90 0.08 0.02 99.87 0.08 0.05 
76% to 95% 343-1,782 99.61 0.30 0.09 99.33 0.41 0.26 
96% to 99% 
1,783-
9,976 97.56 1.80 0.64 95.31 2.97 1.72 
99% to 
99.9% 
9,977-
147,384 90.86 6.64 2.50 83.94 9.69 6.37 
Top 0.1% >147,384 70.96 15.72 13.32 69.06 17.40 13.54 
Total All 99.64 0.26 0.10 99.32 0.42 0.26 
Notes: Table shows the choice of adjustment channel by the size class of firms in terms of turnover (see 
Columns 1 and 2). Panel A focuses on gross expansions while panel B focuses on gross contractions. The three 
columns of each panel give the percentage of total turnover expansions or contractions that is accounted 
for by each channel (figures are unweighted averages over all adjustments belonging to a given size class). 
 
  
Table 3 – Gross Expansion/Contraction in Turnover by Transaction Size (1997-2005)  
 
 A) Expansions in Turnover B) Contractions in Turnover 
Size 
Category of 
Expansion/ 
Contraction 
Exp. Size 
(£’000s) 
Internal 
Adjustm
. 
(%) 
M&A 
(%) 
Greenfiel
d 
(%) 
Contr. 
Size 
(£’000s) 
Internal 
Adjustm
. 
(%) 
M&A 
(%) 
Greenfiel
d 
(%) 
Bottom 50% 1-27 99.99 0.01 0.01 1-24 99.96 0.02 0.02 
51% to 75% 28-89 99.91 0.05 0.04 25-75 99.85 0.09 0.06 
76% to 95% 90-582 99.52 0.32 0.16 76-514 99.09 0.58 0.33 
96% to 99% 
583-
3,625 97.15 2.15 0.70 
515-
3,764 94.33 3.49 2.18 
99% to 
99.9% 
3,625-
61,593 88.92 8.77 2.31 
3,765-
74,311 80.46 11.60 7.93 
Top 0.1% >61,593 77.59 18.16 4.25 >74,311 64.17 21.44 14.40 
Total All 99.64 0.26 0.10 All 99.32 0.42 0.26 
Notes: Table shows the choice of adjustment channel by the size of turnover expansions/contractions (see 
columns 1,2 and 6). Panel A focuses on gross expansions while panel B focuses on gross contractions. The last 
three columns of each panel give the percentage of total turnover expansions or contractions that is 
accounted for by each channel (figures are unweighted averages over all adjustments in a given adjustment 
size class). The first column in each panel lists the range of turnover changes associated with the percentile 
ranges listed in the first column of the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Firm Size, Expansion/Contraction Size and Choice of Adjustment Form 
(multivariate fractional logit) 
 
 Expansion – M&A vs. Internal 
Expansion – 
Greenfield vs. 
Internal 
Contraction – 
M&A vs. Internal 
Contraction – 
Greenfield vs. 
Internal 
0.116*** 0.477*** 0.419*** 0.454*** 
Firm size (logs) 
(5.02) (12.76) (11.49) (12.44) 
0.712*** 0.353*** 0.439*** 0.413*** Expansion/contra
ction size (logs) (25.39) (9.10) (14.20) (15.48) 
Excluded 
channel Internal Internal 
Observations 4,938,769 3,600,679 
Industry FE 2 digit 2 digit 
Source: ONS and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Table shows results for multinomial fractional logit regressions. Figures in brackets are t-stats 
clustered at the 2-digit industry-level (55 industries). The dependent variables are the fractions of 
M&As, greenfield and internal adjustment in total employment or turnover adjustment. Internal 
adjustment is the excluded category. The regressors are initial firm size and the size of the overall 
expansion or contraction. Firm size and expansion/contraction size are measured as the log of 
turnover in ‘000s of British pounds in constant 1995 prices, using 2-digit sectoral output price 
deflators from the EUKLEMS project. All regressions include year and 2-digit industry fixed effects. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Firm Size, Expansion/Contraction Size and Choice of Adjustment Form 
(Tobit and Poisson) 
 Tobit Poisson 
 M&A Greenfield Internal M&A Greenfield Internal 
Expansions 
0.121 0.246 -0.003 0.079 0.446 -0.004 Log(firm size) 
(47.31)*** (52.26)*** (309.96)*** (4.39)*** (12.63)*** (8.54)*** 
0.405 0.260 -0.003 0.612 0.264 -0.004 Log(exp. size) 
(121.04)*** (54.91)*** (321.52)*** (24.66)*** (6.78)*** (7.89)*** 
Observations 4,938,769 4,938,769 4,938,769 4,938,769 4,938,769 4,938,769 
Industry FE 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 
Contractions 
0.291 0.288 -0.016 0.310 0.341 -0.009 Log(firm size) 
(67.93)** (55.98)** (103.52)*** (9.51)** (10.20)** (9.11)*** 
0.293 0.283 -0.032 0.350 0.317 -0.005 Log(contr. 
size) (72.98)** (58.91)** (149.01)*** (12.32)** (11.60)** (7.87)*** 
Observa-tions 3,600,679 3,600,679 3,600,679 3,600,679 3,600,679 3,600,679 
Industry FE 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 
Source: ONS and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Table shows results for Tobit and Poisson regressions. Figures in brackets are t-stats based on 
standard errors clustered at the 2-digit industry-level (55 industries). The dependent variable is the 
fraction of M&As, greenfield and internal adjustment in total turnover adjustment. The regressors are 
initial firm size and the size of the overall expansion and contraction. Firm size and 
expansion/contraction size are measured as the log of turnover in ‘000s of British pounds in constant 
1995 prices, using 2-digit sectoral output price deflators from the EUKLEMS project. All regressions include 
year and 2-digit industry fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1%-level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 6 – Correlation of Target and Acquirer Size 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Acquirer size (log sales) 
Acquirer size 
(log sales) 
Acquirer size 
(log sales) 
Acquirer size 
(log sales) 
0.374*** 0.300*** 0.316*** 0.243*** Target size (log 
sales) (0.020) (0.030) (0.037) (0.047) 
  0.113*** 0.100*** Size of the acquired 
asset (enterprise log 
sales)   (0.038) (0.033) 
Observations 45,128 45,128 44,589 44,589 
FE Year only Year & 3-digit-Industry-Pair Year only 
Year & 3-digit-
Industry-Pair 
Source: ONS and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Table shows results for OLS regressions. Figures in brackets are t-stats clustered at the 
enterprise group level (columns 1 and 3) or at the 3-digit industry-pair level (columns 2 and 4). The 
dependent variable is the size of the acquiring enterprise group, the independent variable the size 
of the enterprise group selling an enterprise. Columns 3 and 4 also include the size of the sold-off 
enterprise. Size is measured as the log of turnover in ‘000s of British pounds in constant 1995 prices, 
using 2-digit sectoral output price deflators from the EUKLEMS project. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 7 – Average Within-Industry Acquirer-Target Size Differences 
 
1.42 Average of Within-Industry Acquirer-Target Size 
Differences (log points of initial turnover)  
Acquirer-target size difference positive and significant, 
fraction of all industries 85% 
Acquirer-target size difference positive but insignificant, 
fraction of all industries 7% 
Acquirer-target size difference negative but 
insignificant, fraction of all industries 5% 
Acquirer-target size difference negative and 
significant, fraction of all industries 3% 
Observations 45,128 
Source: ONS and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Table shows the average across industries of within-industry acquirer-target size differences 
(line 1), and the fraction of industries in which acquirer-target size differences are positive and 
significant, positive but insignificant, negative but insignificant, and negative and significant, 
respectively (lines 2-5). Size differences are measured as the log difference of initial turnover 
between the acquiring and the selling enterprise group. Turnover is measured in ‘000s of British 
pounds in constant 1995 prices, using 2-digit sectoral output price deflators from the EUKLEMS 
project. 
 
 
Table A4 – Firm Size, Expansion/Contraction Size and Choice of Adjustment Form 
(multivariate fractional logit – two-tier structure) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Expansion – 
External vs. 
Internal 
Expansion – 
Greenfield vs. 
M&A 
Contraction – 
External vs. 
Internal 
Contraction – 
Greenfield vs. 
M&A 
0.199*** 0.154*** 0.433*** 0.023** Firm size (logs) 
(8.11) (13.43) (12.15) (2.64) 
0.629*** -0.159*** 0.429*** -0.011 Expansion/contra
ction size (logs) (22.76) (-12.67) (15.18) (-1.56) 
Excluded 
channel Internal M&A Internal M&A 
Observations 4,938,769 30,763 3,600,679 36,456 
Industry FE 2 digit 2 digit 2 digit 2 digit 
Source: ONS and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Table shows results for multinomial fractional logit regressions. Figures in brackets are t-stats 
clustered at the 2-digit industry-level (55 industries). The dependent variables are the fractions of 
M&As, greenfield and internal adjustment in total employment or turnover adjustment. Internal 
adjustment is the excluded category. The regressors are initial firm size and the size of the overall 
expansion or contraction. Firm size and expansion/contraction size are measured as the log of 
turnover in ‘000s of British pounds in constant 1995 prices, using 2-digit sectoral output price 
deflators from the EUKLEMS project. All regressions include year and 2-digit industry fixed effects. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, respectively. 
 
